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SHOPLIFTING AND THE LAW OF ARREST:
THE MERCHANT'S DILEMMA
SHOPLIFTING is the theft of goods displayed for sale.' Today, with retailers'
emphasis on uncovered display and "self-service," 2 the annual number of such
thefts runs well into the millions.3 American store thieves, from the occasion-
ally tempted amateur to the studied professional, 4 steal annually merchandise
with a retail value of over 250 million.5 And shoplifting is apparently an
uninsurable risk.6 Behind this common form of theft is often a ganglion which
sends shoots into other areas of criminal enterprise.7 Yet the incessant and
systematic sack of retail stores is accomplished with little risk of arrest and
prosecution.8 Merchants and police must combat the shoplifter with unwieldly
and outmoded laws delimiting the right to apprehend him and bring him before
legal authority.9 Currently, the awakened interest of merchants reinforces the
1. This is the description employed in the records of most metropolitan police de-
partments. Interview with Raymond J. Eagan, Capt. of Detectives, New Haven, Conn.,
Dep't of Police Service, November 18, 1952.
2. Address of Edward Wetton, Div. Operating Mgr., Stix, Baer & Fuller Dept. Store
(St. Louis, Mo.), at Store Management Sess., Convention of Nat. Retail Dry Goods
Ass'n, January 14, 1953 (copy in Yale Law Library). See also POLLAK, Tun CRIMINAL-
ITy OF WomEN 34-5 (1950).
3. See Sterling, Stop That Shoplifter!, The Saturday Evening Post, October 22,
1949, pp. 19, 67.
4. See text at notes 18-29 infra. The Operating Director of the Chicago Crime Com-
mission has concluded that shoplifters ". . . are among the most professionalized of our
lawbreaking population." Peterson, Crime Does Pay, The Atlantic, February, 1953, p, 41,
5. It is estimated that variety stores charge off 1!2 percent of total dollar sales to
pilferage loss, while department and drug stores recognize a 1 percent loss and grocery
stores, 3/4th of 1 percent. Cracking Do=n on Shoplifters, Business Week, November 1,
1952, p. 58. This means, on the basis of 1948 United States Census of Business retail
sales figures, that the American shoplifter in that year occasioned losses approximating
$146,580,000 in drug and department stores, $61,925,000 in grocery stores, and $37,601,000
in variety stores: a total of $246,106,000. Inflation and an uptrend in the crime have un-
doubtedly swelled the "take" since 1948.
6. "[S]hoplifting losses are not considered insurable .... This is largely because it
would be next to impossible to determine just what part of stock shortages ... could be
charged to this type of theft." Communication to the YALE LAw JOURNAL from a lead-
ing insurance company, dated October 31, 1952. (Name of company withheld by request.)
"The high frequency of the losses and the small amount involved in each incident
would cause the expense of investigating and making reimbursement to exceed the pro-
portion considered appropriate... ." Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from a
leading insurance company, dated December 18, 1952. (Name of company withheld by
request.) See also CRORAUGH & REDDING, CASUALTY INSURANCE 607 (1928).
7. See text at notes 30-8 infra.
8. See APPENDIX, infra.
9. See pages 792-7 infra.
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desire of law enforcement agencies to reach the shoplifter and the men behind
him.10 Without jeopardizing the shopper's freedom from arbitrary restraint,
the law of arrest must be remolded to form a sharper weapon against shop-
lifting.
THE NATURE OF THE CRIME
A form of larceny,' store theft denotes the non-consensual taking and carry-
ing away of a merchant's property, with an intent permanently to deprive him
of possession.'- The store thief must grasp the article ("caption") 13 and, in
the absence of a statute to the contrary, move the article from its resting place
("asportation"). 4 Even momentary possession combined with any removal
fulfills the requirement of caption and asportation.r The essential element of
intent to steal, however, usually must be inferred from proof that the accused
made an elaborate attempt to conceal the item on his person '0 or that he
carried it out of the store without offering payment.'T
10. See note 118 infra and accompanying text.
11. See, generally, MiLLER, CmMNA.L L.-w §§ 109-115 (1934); R ,aPLJEi, Lncmz:.
§§ 1-305 (1892).
12. Cf. Black v. State, 83 Ala. 81, 3 So. 814 (18IS); People v. Hoban, 240 I1. Z03,
88 N.E. 806 (1909): Dunlavey v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 521, 35 S.E.2d 763 (1945).
See also, AN ATTORNEY AT LAW, THE LAW OF A msrs T N Born CrvIL A.m Cnn.x:I.
CAsEs 148 (1742).
13. Cf. People v. Williams. 73 CaL App.2d 154, 166 P.2d 63 (1946) ; People v. Balrer,
365 Ill. 328, 6 N.E.2d 665 (1936) ; Rosenbush v. State. 136 Tex. Crim. 50, 122 S.W2d
1071 (1938).
14. Cf. People v. Edwards, 72 Cal. App. 102, 236 Pac. 944 (1925) ; People v. Walker,
361 II. 482, 198 N.E. 353 (1935). For a statute abolishing the asportation requirement,
see TEx. PENAL CODE art. 1412 (Vernon, 1925), Krause v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 197,
206 S.W.2d 257 (1947).
15. E.g., Blakeney v. State, 244 Ala. 262, 13 So.2d 430 (1943); People v. Dukes, 16
Cal. App.2d 105, 60 P.2d 197 (1936): Fitch v. State, 135 Fla. 361, 185 So. 435 (1938).
16. E.g., People v. Lardner, 300 Ill. 264, 133 N.E. 375 (1921); People v. Bradovich,
305 -Mich. 329, 9 N.W.2d 560 (1943). See Address of Ralph Garber, Chief Ass't Prosecut-
ing Att'y of Wayne County, 'Mich., before Store Management Sess., Store Management
and Personnel Groups Convention of Nat. Retail Dry Goods Ass'n, May 24, 1950.
17. See HuTzEa, THE POLIcEWOMxA.'S HANDOOK 23 (1933); O'SULMvAN., Cmm
DErEcTION 36 (1928). See also W. T. Ga.xZT Co., THE GwAir STo.m A::uAL 3 (June
25, 1951); RETAn. mncFnC.HANs ASS'N OF HOUSTON, INc., SHOpLXFrMG (pamphlet, n.d.)
(copy in Yale Law Library); Communications to the YA.LE LA%,: Joura.AL from Harry
J. Daniels, Chief of Detectives, New Orleans, La., Dep't of Police, dated November 25,
1952; and Harold Anderson, Chief of Detectives, Kansas City, Mo., Police Dep't, dated
December 16, 1952; in the Yale Law Library.
Writers of insurance against liability for false imprisonment attach the condition that
shoplifting arrests be made off the insured's premises. See Communication to the YAmW
LAW JOUP.NAL from P. Tarbetsky, Ass't Superintendent, Nat. of Hartford Group, dated
December 9, 1952, in the Yale Law Library. This illustrates a feeling that proof of in-
tent will be difficult if an arrest is made before the suspect has left the premises.
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Among the diversified drantatis personae of the crime, the pilferers for profit
present the most enticing target for police efforts. True, about 70 percent of
shoplifters are amateurs,'8 usually women 10 and juveniles, 20 who steal for
personal use. (Kleptomaniacs, who steal to satisfy a neurotic compulsion,2 1
seem comparatively rare.22) But a shopper in this otherwise law-abiding group
will steal only on rare occasions, 23 usually when tempted by alluring advertis-
ing and an unguarded display.24 Though a smaller group, professional store
thieves probably occasion greater dollar losses to retailers,2 since their forays,
unlike those of the amateur, are frequent and selective, 20 and the expert shop-
lifter is more likely to go undetected.2 7 Amateurs, apprehended and repri-
manded by the merchants themselves, rarely repeat the offense ;-8 but only
18. See Cracking Down on Shoplifters, supra note 5, at 58. See also Anderson, Fur-
ther Studies of Delinquent Personalities in PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PRosO Asso-
CiATION 439-44 (1919).
19. See EirMNGER, THE PROBLEM OF CRME 27 (1932);. GROSS, ADAM & ADAM,
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 509 (3d ed. 1934).
20. See WEIR, CRIMINOLOGY 28-9 (1941) ; Cracking Down on Shoplifters, supra note
5, at 58; RETAIL MERCHANTS ASS'N OF HOUSTON, INC., Op. cit. supra note 17; SuoLir-
ING IN DEROIr 1 (mimeo. release by Detective Lt. George MeArthey, Dep't of Police,
Detroit, Mich., n.d.) (copy in Yale Law Library).
21. See DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PsYcIARY 319, 326 (1952). For a theory of sexually
motivated kleptomania, see ABRAHAMSEN, WHO ARE THE GUILTY? 150-2 (1952). See also
Henderson, Psychopathic Constitution and Criminal Beijavior in MENTAL ADNORMALIT"
AND CRIME 118 (1944). For a purported kleptomaniacs diary, detailing her mental pro-
cesses, see Anon., A Kleptonaniac's Mind, The Atlantic Monthly, July, 1937, p. 43.
22. Merchants believe that fewer than 1 percent of pilferers are kleptomaniacs. See
Anon., When Lovely Woman Stoops to Stealing, Collier's, August 22, 1925, p. 11; Ster-
ling, supra note 3, at 67; RETAIL MERCHANTS ASS'N OF HOUSTON, INC., Op. Cit. supra
note 17.
23. See statement of W. J. Wallace, See'y-Mgr., Retail Merchants Ass'n (Houston,
Texas), in Store Mgrs. News Bull. of Nat. Retail Dry Goods Ass'n, 3d Quarter, 1952,
p. 11 (copy in Yale Law Library). See also ANDERSON, op. cit. supra note 18, at 439-44
(1919) ; and GRASSBERGER, GEwERBS-UND BERUFSVERBRECHERTUM IN DEN VEREINIGTEN
STAATEN VON AmmHuxA 297 (1933).
24. See GROUT, BURGLARY RISKS 135 (1927) ; POLLAK, op. cit. su pra note 2, at 34-5,
For other possible motivations underlying amateur shoplifting, see Cracking Dol ol
Shoplifters, supra note 5, at 61.
25. See Sterling, supra note 3, at 69.
26. See SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 213-14 (4th ed. 1947). Profes-
sional shoplifters develop a high degree of skill in their craft, ETTnNER, op. cit. sitpra
note 19, at 26, and are often organized, SUTHERLAND, op. Cit. supra, at 208. Specialized
techniques of professional pilferers are described in S6DERMAN & O'CONNELL, MODERN
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 372 (4th ed. 1952). For a case history of organized shoplifting
over a wide geographic area, see Hoover & Collins, Slickers in Slacks, Collier's, October
16, 1943, p. 24.
27. See, e.g., HUTZEL, op. cit. sutpra note 17, at 27; POLLAK, op. cit. supra note 2, at
35-6.
28. See MACDONALD, CRIME IS A BUSINESS 220 (1939). "[I]n many cases, merely
the embarrassment of being caught 'red-handed' is sufficient to return the famateur] of-
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prosecution and incarceration of professional "boosters," effecting complete
removal from circulation, appear to curtail their activities.20
Arrest of the professional shoplifter may serve goals other than the protec-
tion of store owners' property. Under police questioning, the veteran store
thief may supply vital information illuminating other areas of organized crime.
The professional pilferer invariably is connected with one or more receivers
of stolen goods3 10 who, for resale, purchase the plunder of thieves at about
one-fourth its value.31 These "fences," frequently part of an inter-city net-
work, 2 provide the profit motive underlying not only store larceny, but also
many other forms of professional theft.33 Often the receivers lay the plans
for theft campaigns 3 4 and may frustrate arrest and prosecution by wholesale
bribery.35 Thus, incarceration of one receiver following an apprehended shop-
lifter's "tip" may thwart the activities of large numbers of professional thieves
by destroying their source of instruction and protection, and their sales outlet.
Arrest of professional pilferers may also result in the disruption of local traffic
in narcotics. The incidence of drug addiction among store thieves appears to
be extremely high: police authorities and retail associations have estimated
that from 30 to 90 percent of professional shoplifters, depending on the locality,
are addicts.3 6 Of necessity, addicts maintain periodic contact vith narcotics
peddlers. In fact, peddlers, aware that the nation's addicts must support a
fender to the straight and narrow path." Address of Ralph Garber, siupra note 16. See
also Communication to the YALE LAw JOURNAL from Robert N. Bolitho, Public Rela-
tions Dir., Retail Merchants Ass'n of Houston (Texas), Inc., dated November 2, 1952,
in the Yale Law Library.
29. See RErAIL MERCHANTS Ass'N OF HousmTN, INC., op. cit. mspra note 17.
30. See Ass'N OF GRAND JURORs OF N.Y. COUNTY, CRIMINAL PEcnVzRs IN THE
UNITED STATES (1928) passim.
31. See id. at 12, 13; JANDY & FLOCH, N/ncoTic ADDICTION As A FAcroa nI PL-Try
LAcEN I, DEmOIT 13 (1937) ; Klingman, The Booster, the Heel, and the Snitch, Park:
East, January, 1953, p. 14.
32. See SUTHERLAND, PRII NcIPES oF CRIMINOLOGY 203 (4th ed. 1947).
33. See Ass'N OF GRAND JURORS OF N.Y. CouNTY, op. cit. stspra note 30, passim.
34. See SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 203 (4th ed. 1947). The role of
"fences" is not new. See COLQUHOUN, A TREATISE ON THE PozCE or THE M=0rFoLIS
176 (4th ed. 1797).
35. See Ass'N OF GRAND J uras or N.Y. COUNTY, op. cit. stpra note 30, at 15;
S6DERmAI & O'CoNNELL, op. cit. supra note 26, at 357; SUTHERLAND, PMNCIWY 0?
CRIMINOLOGY 165-6 (1st ed. 1934).
36. See RETAIL MERCHANTS Ass'W oF HousTon, INC, op. cit. supra note 17; Com-
munication to the YALE LAw JOURNAL from J. D. Holstrom, Berkeley, CaliL, Chief of
Police Dep't, dated December 3, 1952, in the Yale Law Library. See also JANDY & FLmcH,
op. cit. supra note 31, passim; SUTHERLAND, THE PoFrEssioNrAL THIEF 40 I.S (1937) ;
Hearings before Committee on rays and Means on H.R. 3490 and H.R. 348, 2d Cong.,
1st Sess. 41 (1951). A Los Angeles, Calif., police official has stated that 20-25 percent
of juveniles apprehended for shoplifting are "tied up!' with narcotics. Cracking Dozwnj on
Shoplifters, supra note 5, at 61. See Comment, 62 YALE LJ. 751 (1953) tassim.
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habit costing from $30 to $120 a week,37 frequently suggest store larceny to
their customers as a means of raising money for drugs.3 8 Thus, arrest of an
addict-shoplifter carries the added incentive of suppressing illicit trade in nar-
cotics. Furthermore, law enforcement agencies are interested in the appre-
hension of juvenile store thieves, for shoplifting often constitutes youth's initial
experiment in crime.30 If apprehended early and entrusted to juvenile guid-
ance personnel, young persons may be diverted from further and more am-
bitious criminal activity.40
Despite recognition by both police and merchants of the gravity of the crime
and the importance of effective apprehension, only a small fraction of the
shoplifting offenses known to American retailers are reported by them to the
police.4 1 In 1951, for example, the Department of Police of Detroit, Michigan,
recorded 428 reported cases of shoplifting for the entire city,42 while during
the same period the protection service of a single large Detroit department
store detected over twice that number.43 And in the same year, the Depart-
ment of Police of Worcester, Massachusetts, a city of 273,949 population,
recorded only two known cases of shoplifting.44 Due in part to this paucity of
reports to police, the number of arrests and prosecutions for store larceny
throughout the nation is small. 45 A prime reason for the reluctance of Ameri-
can merchants to seek the arrest and prosecution of pilferers may be found in
the restrictive legal rules circumscribing lawful apprehension of shoplifters.
THE LAw OF ARREST
In a criminal case, an arrest is the taking of a person into custody for the
purpose of bringing him before a court or appropriate official to answer an
allegation of criminal activity.4" And private citizens as well as peace officers
37. See Hearings, supra note 36, at 41. These figures are conservative estimates, See
Stevens, Make Dope Legal, Harper's Magazine, November, 1952, p. 41.
38. See Hearings, supra note 36, at 63; Sterling, supra note 3, at 72.
39. See BURT, THE YOUNG DELINQUENT 449 (4th ed. 1944); RUSSELL & Riavy,
THE MAKING OF THE CRIMINAL 80-1 (1906) ; WEIR, op. cit. supra note 20, at 28-9.
40. See note 28 supra. "It is the ease With which [amateurs] are able to pursue this
racket that causes them to continue... ." MAcDONALD, Op. Cit. supra note 28, at 220. See
also BURT, op. cit. supra note 39, at 452-3.
41. See APPENDIX, infra.
42. Ibid.
43. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL, dated December 1, 1952. (Name of
store withheld by request)
44. See APPENDIX, infra.
45. Ibid.
46. E.g., Davis & Allcott Co. v. Boozer, 215 Ala. 116, 110 So. 28 (1926); Rhodes v.
Walsh, 55 Minn. 542, 57 N.W. 212 (1893) ; State v. District Court, 70 Mont. 378, 225
Pac. 1000 (1924). See also RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 112 (1934); Perkins, The Law of
Arrest, 25 IOwA L. Rzv. 201 (1940).
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may make arrests.47 An arrest may be effected by words joined with physical
touching or seizure,48 or by oral statements alone if the arrestee is thereby
put in fear of force and submits. 0 But not every detention is an "arrest" in
the technical sense of the word.u0 The merchant who halts a suspected shop-
lifter with no intention of turning him over to the police or prosecuting him
in court may be "imprisoning" the suspect, but he is not "arresting" him? 1
The arrest rules usually applicable in store pilferage cases are those govern-
ing arrest for misdemeanors without warrant. The shoplifter ordinarily cap-
tures only relatively inexpensive merchandise: amateurs are afraid to steal
costly articles or in quantity, and most professional pilferers are careful to
avoid the harsh penalties attaching to felony-thefts.r -2 Mloreover, merchants
usually have the good sense not to display e-xpensive articles within easy reach
of the sticky-fingered shopper.53 The Chief of Protection for one of the nationt,
largest department stores has estimated that the average "grab" involves items
worth about $15.54 Consequently, shoplifting is normally a misdemeanor in
states differentiating between grand and petit larceny on the basis of value-
of-goods-stolen?1 And arrest of store thieves must be made without process,
47. Private Persons: E.g., A. CODE tit. 15, § 152 (1940), E. I. Du Pont de Nemours
Powder Co. v. Hyde, 201 Ala. 207, 77 So. 733 (1917) ; CAL PE.-AL CODt § 837 (Deer-
ing, 1941), Hill v. Nelson, 71 Cal. App.2d 528, 162 P2d 927 (1945).
Peace Officers: E.g., Fu.. STAT. AN N. c. 901, § 901.15 (Supp. 1952), Kersey v. State,
58 So.2d 155 (Fla. 1952); IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-1024 (Bums, Cune. Repl. 1942), Har-
ness v. Steele, 159 Ind. 286, 64 N.E. 875 (1902).
48. E.g., Thompson v. Boston Pub. Co., 285 Mass. 344, 129 N.E. 210 (1934); State
v. McClung, 123 IV. Va. 682, 17 S.E.2d 621 (1940).
49. E.g., People v. Mirbelle, 276 Ill. App. 533 (1934); State v. Dunivan, 217 Mo.
App. 548, 269 S.W. 415 (1925).
50. See Wilgus, Arrest Without Warrant, 22 McH. L. REV. 541, 541-57 (1924).
51. Cf. 'McGlone v. Landreth, 200 Okla. 425, 195 P.2d 262 (1943). For cases of false
imprisonment without arrest, see, e.g., Crews-Beggs Dry GoLds Co. v. Bayle, 97 Colo,
568, 51 P.2d 1026 (1935) ; Hassenauer v. F. VN. Woolworth Co., 314 Ill. App. 569, 41
N.E2d 979 (1942).
52. Interview, supra note 1. See also Sterling, supra note 3, at 67.
53. See U.S. DEP'T OF COm=IECE, S:,im.. BUsINEss Am No. 469, Gt'%iPrm- AGAJ.sT
THEFT OF RErAL MERCHANDISE 2 (October, 1948) ; THE GEt=LE AnT o~ Suopuoi-m.r
AND How TO raiovE TmipM.Tio (pamphlet, reprinted by the Nat. Cash Register Co.
from THE CENmAL PHARcmEccL JouRNAL, n.d.) (copy in Yale Law Library).
54. See Sterling, srupra note 3, at 67. For a suggestion that the average for 1953 may
be somewhat higher, see Communication to the YALE LAW Jouu=A. from Michael F,
Glynn, Gen. Mgr., Stores' 'Mutual Protective Ass'n, Inc. (New York, N.Y.), dated [arch
3, 1953, in the Yale Law Library.
55. Interview, supra note 1. See also Communication to the YALE LVw JUur,'.,%L
from 'Michael F. Glynn, supra note 54.
The classification of store theft is controlled by statutes labeling the crime a fulony
(grand larceny) or a misdemeanor (petit larceny), depending on the retail market value
of the property stolen. The dividing-line varies in different states from $20 tO $!UD. See,
e.g., MASs. ANN. LAws c. 266, § 30 (Supp. 1952) ($100) ; R. I. GE,. Lws c. 643,8 § IM
(1938) ($500) ; IV. V. CoDz ANN. § 5954 (1949) ($20). All larceny is made a felony in
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if at all, since in a shoplifting context there is almost never time to secure a
warrant before the offender, unidentified, has departed with his plunder50
Arrest without warrant for misdemeanors is hedged about by the strictest
of rules. Under the usual common-law rule, neither a peace officer nor a pri-
vate person may arrest without warrant for a misdemeanor even though com-
mitted in his presence.5 7 And the subsequent securing of a warrant will not
render lawful any restraint prior to its issuance." The common law still
governs peace officers ? in fourteen states 60 and private persons in twenty-
nine states 61 and in the District of Columbia.
Many statutes modify, partially at least, the common-law rules.02 These
statutes empower peace officers to arrest for misdemeanors without warrant
in some situations. In thirty states and the District of Columbia the arrest
is valid if the offense was committed in the arresting officer's presence.00
four states. DEL. CODE REv. § 5200 (1935) ; IND. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-3001, 10-3002 (Burns,
Cum. Repl. 1942) ; PENNA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4807 (Purdon, 1930) ; TNN. Coon A14 N.
§ 10925 (Williams, 1934). Shoplifting is made a felony by statute in one state. Mtie,.
STAT. ANN. § 28.592 (Supp. 1951), People v. Huffman, 315 Mich. 134 (1946).
56. See Interview, supra note 1.
57. Peace Officers: E.g., Commonwealth v. Wright, 158 Mass. 149 (1893); Booth
v. Hanley, 2 C. & P. 288 (1826) ; Hardy v. Murphy, 1 Esp. 294 (1795).
Private Persons: E.g., Palmer v. Maine Cent. R.R., 92 Me. 399, 42 At. 800 (1899) ,
Mathews v. Biddulph, 3 Man..& G. 390 (1841); Fox v. Gaunt, 3 B. & Ald. 798 (1832).
See also 9 HALSBURY, LAws OF ENGLAND § 117 (2d ed. 1933).
A few judicial decisions have extended the power of arrest. E.g., Callahan v. State,
163 Md. 298, 162 Atl. 856 (1932) (peace officer may arrest without warrant for mis-
demeanor committed in presence) ; Muscoe v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 443 (1890) (same).
As to private persons in cases of theft, see Malley v. Lane, 97 Conn. 133, 115 Atd, 674
(1921) semble.
In cases of misdemeanors amounting to breaches of the peace due to the presence of
violence, a different rule applies. E.g., Quinn v. Heisel, 40 Mich. 576 (1879); Timothy
v. Simpson, 1 Cr. M. & R. 757 (1935). Shoplifting has never been deemed a breach of
the peace. See Comment, 46 ILL. L. REv. 887, 895 n.19 (1952).
58. Implicit in damage award in, e.g., Jefferson Dry Goods Co. v. Stoess, 304 Ky. 73,
199 S.W.2d 994 (1947) (warrant not issued until suspected shoplifter taken to police
station).
59. The term "peace officer" includes sheriffs and their deputies, constables, city and
town marshalls, and policemen. See Wilgus, Arrest Without Warrant, 22 Micn. L. REV.
541, 561-2 (1924).
60. Colo.; Conn.; Del.; Kans.; Ky.; Md.; Miss.; N.J.; N.C.; Texas; Vt.; Va,
Wash.; W. Va.
61. States listed note 60 supra, and: Ariz.; Ark.; Fla.; Ind.; La.; Me.; Mass,;
Mich.; Mo.; N.H.; N.M.; Ohio; Penna.; R.I.; Wis.
62. In some cities, powers of arrest are extended by municipal ordinance. See, e.g.,
MUNICIPAL CODE OF CHICAGO c. 173 (1939) (store employees) ; Szymanski v. Great At-
lantic & Pacific Tea Co., 79 Ohio. App. 407, 409, 74 N.E.2d 205, 206 (1947) (Toledo,
Ohio; private policemen).
63. ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 154 (1940) ; ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 44-124 (1939) ; ARx. STAT.
ANN. §43-403 (1947); CAL. PENAL CODE §849 (Deering, 1941); FLA. STAT. ANN.
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Illinois and Iowa are more liberal, allowing a peace officer to arrest without
warrant where a misdemeanor has been committed outside his presence if he
has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested is guilty."c
These two jurisdictions tolerate a reasonable error as to the offender.c5 The
arrest statutes of Rhode Island and Wisconsin go even further, allowing, in
addition, a reasonable error as to whether an offense was in fact committed.0C
Moreover, some statutes authorize private persons to arrest without warrant.
Citizens of seventeen states possess this arrest power for misdemeanors com-
mitted in their presence. 7 In Nebraska and Wyoming, citizens actually wield
broader statutory arrest powers in cases of petit larceny than do peace officers,
presumably because private persons are more likely to be at the scene. In
these states a private citizen may arrest a petit larceny suspect if a theft has
in fact been committed and reasonable grounds existed for believing the person
arrested guilty of the offense.6 s
In sum, most statutes clothe either peace officers or private persons with
power to arrest without warrant where three events coincide: (1) an offense
has, in fact, been committed (2) in the presence of the person given authority
§901.15 (1943); GA. CODE ANN. §27-207 (1938); IDAHO COau §19-603 (1943); IND.
STAT. ANN. § 9-1024 (Burns, Cum. Repl. 1942); LA. REv. STAT. tit. 15, § 60 (1950);
'ME. REv. STAT. c. 134, §4 (1944) ; MAss. ANN. LAws c. 276, §23 (Supp. 1951) (larceny);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.874 (1935) ; MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 629.34 (1946) ; Mo. REv. ST.AT.
ANN. §§, e.g., 6581, 7674 (1943) ; MONT. REv. CODES AxN. § 94-003 (1947) ; NEn. R m.
STAT. § 29-401 (1943); NEv. Comp. LAws § 10751 (Hillyer, 1929); N.H. Laws 1941,
c. 163, § 6; N.2M. ST.AT. ANN. § 14-1606 (1941) ; N.Y. Can.. CODE & PENAL LAW § 177
(Clevenger & Gilbert, 1951); N.D. REv. CODE §29-0615 (1944); OHio GEN. CoDz Am;.
§ 13432-1 (Page, 1939) ; OmLa. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 196 (1937) ; Oar. Cop'. Lws A :.
§ 26-1532 (Bancroft-Whitney, 1940); PENNA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 12193-2005 (Purdon,
Supp. 1952) ; S.C. CODE OF LAWs §§ 17-251 (larceny), 17-253, 17-254 (1952) ; S.D. CODZ
§ 34.1609 (1939); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 11536 (Williams, 1934); UTAH COvz AxN. § 77-
13-3 (1953) ; Wyo. Comp. STAT. § 10-301 (1946) ; D.C. CODE § 4-140 (1951).
64. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 657 (Smith-Hurd, 1935), People v. Roberta, 352 IlL 19,
185 N.E. 253 (1933) ; IOwA CODE ANN. § 755.4 (1950), State v. Small, 134 Iowa SU, 169
N.W. 116 (1918).
65. Cf. People v. Caruso, 339 II. 258, 171 N.E. 128 (1930).
66. R.I. Pub. Laws 1941, c. 982, § 68, cl. 5; Wis. STAT. § 354.03 (1951), State v. Cox,
258 Wis. 162, 45 N.W.2d 100 (1950).
67. ALA. CODE fit. 15, § 15S (1940) ; CAL PENAL CODE § 837 (Deering, 1941); GA.
CODE ANN. § 27-211 (1933) ; IDAHO CODE § 19-604 (1948) ; ILL. AmN. STAT. c. 33, § 657
(Smith-Hurd, 1935); IOwA CODE ANN. § 755.5 (1950); Mnru. STAT. Am;. § 629.37
(1946) ; MONT. RE V. CODES ANN. § 94-6004 (1947) ; NEv. Co'p. L Aws § 10752 (Hillyer,
1929); N.Y. Cans. CODE & PENAL LAW § 183 (Clevenger & Gilbert, 1951) ; N.D. Rrv%
CODE § 29-0620 (1944) ; Oxs.A. STAT. ANN. fit. 22, § 202 (1933) ; Omn. Coup. LAWS Am.
§ 26-1537 (Bancroft-Whitney, 1940) ; S.C. CODE or LAws § 17-251 (1952) (larceny); S.D.
CODE § 34.1608 (1939) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 11541 (Williams, 1934) ; UTAH Cow; A.:;.
§ 77-13-4 (1953).
68. NEB. REv. ST T. § 29-402 (1943), Morrow v. State, 140 Neb. 592, S00 N.W. 343
(1941) ; Wyo. Cons'. STAT. ANN. § 10-302 (1946).
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to arrest, and (3) the arrestee is, in fact, the person guilty of the offense. But
modem-day merchants and police find even this statutory liberalization of
arrest rules impotent against the shoplifting plague.
Store theft is a crime of stealth and rarely takes place in the "presence" of
police or authoritative store personnel.69 Few police departments maintain
even small shoplifting squads,70 and these men can lurk within view of only
the barest fraction of pilferage offenses as they occur. Some prosperous mer-
cantile establishments hire trained store detectives,71 but professional shop-
lifting teams are quick to spot and decoy them from the area of intended
theft.72 The same tactics may dispose of supervisory personnel.73 And an un-
lawful arrest results if a harassed supervisor or storekeeper who did not ob-
serve the theft attempts an arrest himself or summons a policeman from the
street who did not see the "grab."7 4 The supervisor or storekeeper who in-
stigates the arrest by calling the policeman, as well as the officer, is deemed
an arrester.
75
69. An offense occurs in a person's "presence" when his own senses render him aware
that it is being committed. Hoppes v. State, 70 Okla. Crim. 179, 105 P.2d 433 (1940).
Presence in a -shoplifting case is defined as "within view." Cf. MAcan, THE LAW OF
ARREST § 24(b) (1950).
70. Of 65 police departments responding to a questionnaire distributed by the YALE
LAw JOURNAL, seven maintain a permanent anti-shoplifting squad: Kansas City, Mo, (4
men); Miami, Fla.; New Orleans, La. (2 men) ; Pittsburgh, Pa.; St. Paul, Minn. (2
men) ; San Antonio, Texas; San Francisco, Calif. Many others reported maintenance of
such a squad during the pre-Christmas period, when shoplifting reaches its annual peak.
71. See SHALLoo, PRivATE PoLIac 193-4 (1933). See also Nugent, Modern Store
Protection in THE "LADY OF LyoNs" 27 (2d ed. 1943) (publication of Pinkerton's Nat,
Detective Agency, Inc.) (copy in Yale Law Library). In some jurisdictions, store
detectives possess police powers of arrest. See SHALLOO, op. Cit. .Sltpra.
72. Interview with department store manager, New York, N.Y., November 15, 1952,
(Name withheld by request.)
73. Ibid.
74. E.g., Hanna v. Raphael Weill & Co., 90 Cal. App.2d 461, 203 P.2d 564 (1949);
McDermott v. W. T. Grant Co., 313 Mass. 736, 49 N.E.2d 115 (1943); Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. Wickline, 188 Va. 485, 50 S.E.2d 387 (1948). Some cases appear to hold
that a private person is not liable for false imprisonment where he, possessing the right
to make a lawful arrest because the crime occurred in his presence, summons a peace
officer to make the arrest instead. E.g., James v. San Antonio A.P.R.R., 53 Tex. Civ,
App. 603, 116 S.W. 642 (1909).
75. E.g., Aldridge v. Fox, 348 Ill. App. 96, 108 N.E.2d 139 (1952) ; McDermott v.
W. T. Grant Co., 313 Mass. 736, 49 N.E.2d 115 (1943); Howell v. Viener, 179 Miss,
872, 176 So. 731 (1937). The storekeeper would not be deemed an arrester where lie
merely laid the facts of the supposed theft before a peace officer who subsequently deter-
mined on his own initiative to arrest. E.g., Zinkfein v. W. T. Grant Co., 236 Mass. 228,
128 N.E. 24 (1920) ; Vimont v. S.S. Kresge Co., 291 S.W. 159 (Mo. App. 1927). Words
such as "Stop that woman I" or "Take charge of him" constitute "instigation" of arrest.
McGill v. Walnut Realty Co., 235 Mo. App. 874, 148 S.W.2d 131 (1941); Harris v. Ter-
minal R.R. Ass'n of St. L., 203 Mo. App. 324, 218 S.W. 686 (1920).
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Salespersons are the most frequent witnesses to shoplifting.76 They are,
however, often deterred by company directive from invoking their statutory
arrest power.77  Store managements, jealous of customer goodwill, fear that
lesser employees may prove over-eager and undiplomatic, thus precipitating
unnecessary scenes with suspected pilferers on the sales floor.78 But the most
compelling reason for merchants' de-emphasis on arrest is rooted in the doc-
trine that all persons who arrest without warrant for misdemeanors do so at
their peril :79 if the suspect later is found innocent the arrest will be deemed
unlawful, no matter how reasonable the arrester's suspicions.80 While training
programs, work manuals, and bulletins can be employed to discourage store
personnel from making reckless accusations,8 ' modem merchandising methods
together with the behavior peculiar to shoppers and to thieves create an ever-
present danger of reasonable but erroneous suspicion of theft. For example,
when a clerk observes a woman who, after hovering about an uncovered dis
play, places an unwrapped article in her purse, he cannot be certain that she
has not brought it to the store to match or compare wNith the items on the
counter.82 Furthermore, professional shoplifters often pave the way for claims
of erroneous arrest by promptly transferring stolen goods to confederates.8 3
And the deliberate feigning of shoplifting to induce store personnel to arrest
unlawfully is a racket of serious proportions in some areas.84 Thus, the threat
of unlawful arrest hangs over almost all attempts to apprehend shoplifters.
76. Interview, supra note 72.
77. See, e.g., W. T. GRNT Co., THE GrxNr STQRE MMANIUAL 3 June 25, 1951);
Supermarket News, August 11, 1952, p. 19, col. 4.
78. Interview, supra note 72.
79. Interview with department store manager, Toledo, Ohio, Dec. 2, 1952 (iiame
withheld by request) ; Interview, supra note 72.
80. E.g., Schramko v. Boston Store of Chicago, 243 IlL App. 251 (1927); Jeffermn
Dry Goods Co. v. Stoess, 304 Ky. 73, 199 S.V.2d 994 (1947) ; Titus v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 232 Mo. App. 987, 123 S.W.2d 574 (1938) ; Gold v. Armer, 140 App. Div. 73, 124
N.Y.Supp. 1069 (3d Dep't 1910). Contra: Coverstone v. Davies, 33 Cal2d 325, 239 P24
876 (1952) (peace officer may arrest when he has reasonable ground to believe mis-
demeanor committed in presence); Hill v. Day, 163 Kan. 604, 215 P2d 219 (195U) (same).
See also Note, 25 So. C.-ir. L. REV. 449 (1952).
Probable cause will, however, relieve defendant of liability for punitive damages. E.g.,
Titus v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra.
81. See, e.g., I.s-Au, MAN UA . o SToVE PnorrcnoN 2-3 (1951) (prepared for and
published by the Retail Special Services Ass'n, Inc., Chicago, IL.).
82. "Honest customers often bring unwrapped merchandise into your store for ex-
change, refund, matching purposes and other reasons." RE-,AL M-aPcAls Ass':z o0"
HOUSTON, INc., op. cit. szpra note 17. See, e.g., Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer,
126 Fla. 308, 171 So. 214 (1936); M eCrory Stores Corp. v. Satchell, 148 -ld. 279, 129
AtI. 348 (1925).
83. See PoLIAx, op. cit. s&Pra note 2, at 36.
84. See S6DER,AN & O'CONSEL, op. cit. supra note 26, at 372; Rmu. M nC,,:;T;S
Ass'.N OF HousToN, Ic., op. cit. sz4pra note 17.
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TORT CONSEQUENCES OF UNLAWFUL ARREST
Merchants and peace officers must heed the restrictions of arrest law since
any misstep gives rise to the popular tort action of false imprisonment8 8
Absent justification in law, any restraint against a person's will, either by
force or fear, constitutes false imprisonment.80 An unlawful arrest is one
form of the tort,8 7 and the victim may recover damages for loss of time, phy-
sical discomfort and injury, mental suffering due to humiliation, and injury
to reputation.88 The financially responsible mercantile establishments are sued
most frequently, via respondeat superior for actions of store personnel,80 al-
though suits against peace officers are not unknown.0 0 And plaintiffs' judg-
ments for several thousands of dollars are fairly common.0 1 Moreover, the
85. "Business men, because of painful experience gained through civil suits, are ex-
tremely wary of making arrests or initiating prosecutions [of shoplifters]. . . ." Com-
munication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from J. D. Holstrom, Berkeley, Calif., Chief of
Police Dep't, dated December 3, 1952, in the Yale Law Library. See also Crackbig Down
on Shoplifters, supra note 5, at 61; Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from F. L.
Doyle, Albuquerque, N.M., Ass't Chief of Police Dep't, dated December 17, 1952, in the
Yale Law Library.
On the other hand, peace officers frequently appear willing to ignore the law of arrest
in their efforts to apprehend shoplifters. The officials of the Interstate Commission on
Crime in 1939 estimated that over 75 percent of all arrests by peace officers are unlawful,
Warner, Investigating the Law of Arrest, 26 A.B.A.J. 151 (1940). The Chief of Police
for a large eastern city, in answer to a questionnaire distributed by the YALE LAW
JoURNAL, commented: "[Ain officer cannot arrest on a misdemeanor unless it is com-
mitted in his presence. However, the impracticalness of strict adherence to this policy
should be obvious....!
86. E.g., Crews-Beggs Dry Goods Co. v. Bayle, 97 Colo. 568, 51 P.2d 1026 (1935);
Miller v. Ashcraft, 98 Ky. 314, 32 S.W. 1085 (1895). See also PRossEa, ToRTs § 12
(1941). It is essential that the restraint be against the subject's "will." E.g., Meinecke
v. Skaggs, 123 Mont. 308, 213 P.2d 237 (1949) ; Fenn v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.,
209 S.W. 885 (Mo. 1919) ; James v. MacDougall & Southwick Co., 134 Wash. 314, 235
Pac. 812 (1925). But cf. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Billups, 253 Ky. 126, 69
S.W.2d 5 (1934). It is not necessary, however, that plaintiff prove he attempted to escape,
See, e.g., Titus v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 232 Mo. App. 987, 123 S.W.2d 574 (1938).
False imprisonment is a misdemeanor in some states. E.g., CoLO. STAT. ANN. C. 48,
§75 (1936); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:103-1 (1939).
87. Grago v. Vassello, 173 Misc. 736, 19 N.Y.S.2d 34 (Sup. Ct. 1940). See PRossER,
ToRTs § 12 (1941).
88. E.g., S. H. Kress & Co. v. Powell, 132 Fla. 471, 180 So. 757 (1938) ; W. T. Grant
Co. v. Owens, 149 Va. 906, 141 S.E. 860 (1928).
89. E.g., Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 126 Fla. 308, 171 So. 214 (1936);
Long v. Eagle 5, 10 and 25 Cent Store Co., 214 N.C. 146, 198 S.E. 573 (1938). See Com-
ment, 47 N.U.L. Ra,. 82, 92-8 (1952).
90. "Seldom have I talked to five or six police officers without finding that one of
them had at some time in his career been sued for false arrest." Warner, lvestigalitg the
Law of Arrest, 26 A.B.A.J. 151, 155 (1940). However, peace officers are often judgment-
proof. HopxIxs, OUR LAWLESS POLICE 90 (1931). See also Hall, Police and Law n a
Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 153-4 (1953).
91. E.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Medline, 104 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1939) ($3,000) ;
Jefferson Dry Goods Co. v. Stoess, 304 Ky. 73, 199 S.W.2d 994 (1947) ($3,048.40) J. J.
Newberry Co. v. Judd, 259 Ky. 309, 82 S.W.2d 359 (1935) ($1,750).
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frequency of high out-of-court settlements encourages the pressing of such
claims. 2 Although some large and prosperous mercantile concerns may insure
against tort liability, 3 most merchants apparently cannot afford the cost of
such insurance.9
Cases in which an innocent person is mistakenly arrested for pilfering spawn
the majority of false imprisonment actions against merchants.0 5 But guilty
persons may also sue. A plea of guilty to, or conviction of, a misdemeanor
does not bar the arrestee's false imprisonment suit grounded on unlawful
arrest0 6 Unless he is demanding punitive damages, the plaintiff's guilt is
apparently not admitted even to mitigate damages.97 The anomalous result:
a guilty shoplifter may recover for mental anguish and loss of reputation oc-
casioned by his arrest for shoplifting.
PATTERNS OF SELF-HELP
The ever-present threat of tort liability for unlawful arrest has caused mer-
chants to shun arrest in their struggle against shoplifting. 3 Instead, mer-
chants resign themselves to techniques of self-help. Store owners may place
all small items in glass cases, post signs announcing that the establishment
employs store detectives, instruct clerks to make their presence constantly felt
by customers, strategically locate mirrors, and institute check-out systems of
92. Communication to the YALE LAw JouvmzAL from counsel for a nation-wide chain
of variety stores, dated November 24, 1952. (Name withheld by request.) See SUTnm-
LAND, THE PROFEsSioN.AL THIuF 49 n.7 (1937).
93. Communication to the YXALF Lw JoURN;AL from Richard A. Winsluw, Ass't
Counsel, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (Boston, Mass.), dated March 13, 1953, in the
Yale Law Library.
94. Interviews with store managers in New Haven, Conn., New York, N.Y., and
Toledo, Ohio. (Names withheld by request.) See Communicatiun to the YA.x LAw
JoupRAL from NV. C. Leavitt, Mgr., Burglary & Glass, Saint Paul-Mercury Indemnity
Co. (St. Paul, Minn.), dated March 25, 1953, in the Yale Law Library.
95. Interviews, supra note 94. In few cases do the facts suggest that the plaintiff was
guilty. See cases cited in first paragraph of note 97 infra.
96. E.g., Collins v. Owens, 77 Cal. App.2d 713, 176 P.2d 372 (1947) ; McCullough v.
Greenfield, 133 Mich. 463, 95 N.W. 532 (1903) ; Crosswhite v. Barnes, 139 Va. 471, 124
S.E. 242 (1924). Contra: Erie R.R. v. Reigherd, 166 Fed. 247 (6th Cir. 1969).
97. E.g., Fitscher v. Rollman & Sons Co., 31 Ohio App. 340, 167 N.E. 469 (1929);
S. H. Kress & Co. v. Rust, 97 S.W.2d 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), afJ'd, 132 Te.. S9,
120 S.XV.2d 425 (1938).
On the other hand, evidence of plaintiff's acquittal in the criminal action is not ad-
missible at the trial of his false imprisonment claim. Pilos v. First National Stores, 319
Mass. 475, 66 N.E.2d 576 (1946). Contra: Allen v. William J. Burns International De-
tective Agency, 121 Ore. 492, 256 Pac. 197 (1927).
A plea of guilty by, or conviction of, plaintiff would probably rebut a claim fur puni-
tive damages. See Collins v. Owens, 77 Cal. App.2d 713, 717, 176 P2d 372, 375 (1947);
Crosswhite v. Barnes, 139 Va. 471, 484-5, 124 S.E. 242, 246 (1924). See also Note, 27
NoRE D mz LAw. 252, 257 (1952).
98. See first paragraph of note 85 supra.
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parcel inspection." Most important, when these devices fail to deter the shop-
lifter, merchants will deal with suspects without resort to police assistance. 100
The retailer can, of course, seek to settle cases on an amicable, voluntary basis
without risk of tort liability.10 1 Moreover, a merchant who has lost possession
of his property as the result of a wrongful taking may demand its return; if
return is refused and he acts promptly, the property owner may recapture his
goods by reasonable force.'0 2 However, he may never use force to coerce pay-
ment,10 3 and he will be liable for assault and battery or false imprisonment if
the suspected pilferer has in fact taken nothing, 10 4 or is in rightful possession
of the goods.'0 5 Thus the merchant's forcible attempt at recaption, like his
arrest of a suspect, is undertaken at peril. 100 Furthermore, merchants often
go beyond the common-law recaption doctrine by detaining and searching the
suspect against his will.' °T While the absence of an intent to prosecute the
suspect avoids the "arrest" label,' 0 8 the tort consequences are the same. 10 9
99. See, e.g., U.S. DEr'T OF CoMMaacE, SMA.L BUSINESS AID No. 469, GVARDINa
AGAINST THEr OF RETAIL MERCHANDISE (October, 1948); Tun GENT E ART or Sno,-
LIFTING AND HOW TO REmovE TEMPTATION, op. cit. msfra note 53; Cracking Down on
Shoplifters, supra note 5, at 61. Detention of a customer at a check-out point for parcel
inspection may, however, result in a false imprisonment. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Co. v. Smith, 281 Ky. 583, 136 S.W.2d 759 (1940).
100. See, e.g., Peterson, Crime Does Pay, The Atlantic, February, 1953, pp. 38, 39.
101. There can be no false imprisonment where the suspect co-operates voluntarily,
See note 86 supra.
102. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 100-6 (1934). E.g., Winter v. Atkinson, 92 I11. App.
162 (1900) ; Curlee v. Scales, 200 N.C. 612, 158 S.E. 89 (1931). See Branston, The For-
cible Recaption of Chattels, 28 L.Q. REV. 262 (1912) passim.
There also exists at common law a right, in some situations, to defend one's personal
property by force to prevent a threatened wrongful taking. E.g., Gyre v. Culver, 47 Barb.
Ch. 592 (N.Y. 1867). Shoplifting rarely presents such a case, however. See Comment, 46
ILL. L REv. 887, 889-92 (1952).
103. Mannaugh v. J. C. Penney Co., 61 S.D. 550, 250 N.W. 38 (1933). Requiring a
shoplifter to pay a lump sum in restitution for supposed previous thefts may result in
conviction for extortion. People v. Fichtner, 118 N.Y.S.2d 392 (2d Dep't 1952).
104. E.g., McCrory Stores Corp. v. Satchell, 148 Md. 279, 129 Atl. 348 (1925);
Scott-Burr Stores Corp. v. Edgar, 181 Miss. 486, 177 So. 766 (1938).
105. Johnson v. Perry, 54 Vt. 459 (1882). See S. H. Kress & Co. v. Musgrove, 153
Va. 348, 149 S.E. 453 (1929).
106. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
107. E.g., Hassenauer v. F. W. Woolworth & Co., 314 Ill. App. 569, 41 N.E.2d 979
(1942) ; Coolahan v. Marshall Field & Co., 159 Ill. App. 466 (1911) ; Hurst v. Mont-
gomery Ward & Co., 145 S.W.2d 992 (Mo. App. 1940); Perkins Bros. v. Anderson, 155
S.W. 556 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913). See also Anon., supra note 21, at 45-6.
108. See note 46 supra.
109. See note 86 supra and accompanying text. Such detention would be no more
justified if made by a peace officer. Although no cases denying the right were found, it
seems clear under most statutes that a peace officer could not justify even brief detention
of a suspected shoplifter against his or her will for questioning. See MACUEN, TIIE LAW
OF ARREST §§ 3, 51 (1950); Waite, The Law of Arrest, 24 TEXAs L. RLV. 279, 296-8
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Yet suspected shoplifters often fail to sue for false imprisonment if they have
been spared a trip to the police station.- 0 And in some cases the store may
be able to obtain from the detained suspect a voluntary release from tort lia-
bility."'
Mindful of the retailer's plight, courts in five states hold that a reasonable
detention for investigation, if based upon probable cause, is not actionable.112
Even in these states the rule is only a halfway solution to the shoplifting
dilemma. Practical obstacles may prevent store employees from personally
apprehending a shopper for questioning. The suspect may struggle violently,
or run from the store; or, once apprehended, he may refuse to answer ques-
tions. In these situations, the merchant may wish to solicit police aid-but
to do so would throw him back into the dangerous area of standard arrest
doctrine." 3 Where detention and questioning are possible, the merchant may,
of course, persuade the thief to confess his guilt and return the stolen item,
ending the episode without need or desire to seek legal sanctions. But if, as a
result of the interview, the retailer considers his suspicions confirmed, the
"presence" and "at peril" doctrines 114 may then frustrate any attempt to trans-
late the detention into a bona fide arrest for purposes of legal action against
the supposed offender.
In recent years, American merchants have discovered that self-help, divorced
from assistance by law enforcement agencies and without prosecution of of-
(1946). 'Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island, however, specifically grant
peace officers power, under certain circumstances, to detain persons for questioning. Miss.
AiN. LAws c. 41, §93 (1952) ; N.H. Laws 1941, c. 163, §2; R.I. Pub. Laws 1941, c. 982,
§ 68, cl. 1. See also text of proposed U=rFomi Arms- Acr, reproduced in Warner, The
Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. Rv. 315, 343 (1942).
110. Interviews with, and communications from, retail store managers and merchants'
legal counsel in New York, N.Y., and Chicago, Ill. (Names withheld by request.)
111. Protection manuals of department and chain stores usually contain instructions
for obtaining releases. (Names of stores withheld by request.) Also, written confessions
are often demanded of shoplifting suspects. See Anon., ,tipra note 21, at 46. For an ex-
treme effort to obtain a confession, see Adams v. F. NV. Voolworth Co., 144 Misc. -27,
257 N.Y.Supp. 776 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
112. MIontgomery Ward & Co. v. Freeman, 199 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1952) (Virginia);
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Valler, 203 Ark. 1063, 189 S.,V2d 361 (1945) ; Bettolo
v. Safeway Stores, 11 Cal. App.2d 430, 54 P.2d 24 (1936); Ted v. May Department
Stores Co., 348 Mo. 696, 155 SA.T2d 74 (1941); Cohen v. Lit Bros., 166 Pa. Super. 26,
70 A.2d 419 (1950). Contra: Jefferson Dry Goods Co. v. Stoess, 304 Ky. 73, 199 S.W2
994 (1947); Martin v. Castner-Knott Dry Goods Co., 27 Tenn. App. 421, 131 S.W.2d
638 (1944).
As to the reasonableness of delay before delivering an arrestcd shopliftig susecZt to a
magistrate or peace officer, see John Lewis & Co., Ltd. v. Sims, [1952] A.C. 676 (arrested
shoplifting suspect detained in shop until chief store detective and managing directrr
could hear evidence).
113. The decisions cited in note 112 supra apply exclusively to merchant self-help;
they do not alter the statutory rules of arrest already discussed.
114. See pages 796-7 supra.
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fenders, cannot cope with the shoplifting problem.115 Retailers agree that the
crime is on the uptrend :116 some merchants have reported a 25 to 30 percent
increase in pilfering in 1952 over the previous year.117 Thus retailers current-
ly announce a desire to co-operate with law enforcement agencies in effecting
the arrest and prosecution of store thieves. 118 Only workable rules of arrest
can implement this new policy.
A PROPOSED SHOPLIFTING ARREST STATUTE
A revision of law should broaden the merchant's and peace officer's power
to detain and arrest without subjecting the innocent shopper to the burden
of arbitrary restraint and questioning. 19 To further this policy, the following
is proposed as a model arrest statute to govern the detention and arrest of
persons suspected of store larceny:
1. A peace officer, or a merchant, or a merchant's employee, may
use reasonable force to detain for questioning for a reasonable length
of time on the merchant's premises any person whom he has reason-
able ground to believe has committed larceny of goods displayed for
sale by the merchant. Such detention shall not constitute an arrest.
2. A peace officer may arrest without warrant any person whom
he has reasonable ground to believe has committed larceny of goods
displayed for sale. A charge made to a peace officer by a merchant
or a merchant's employee shall constitute a reasonable ground for
such arrest. No merchant or merchant's employee shall be criminally
or civilly liable for false arrest or false imprisonment of any person
arrested under this paragraph where said merchant or merchant's
employee had a reasonable ground for charging said person with
commission of larceny of goods displayed for sale.
The first paragraph of the suggested enactment, based upon the current rule
in a few states,120 permits reasonable detention and questioning without resort
115. See Cracking Dow= on Shoplifters, supra note 5, passim. See also note 116 infra.
116. See Address of Edward Wetton, supra note 2; Address of S. W. Landon, Short-
age Controller, The Hecht Co. (Washington, D.C.), at Convention of Controllers' Cong.,
of the Nat. Retail Dry Goods Ass'n, May 28, 1952; Communication to the YALt: LAW
JoURNAL from Raymond J. Burns, Pres. of Win. J. Burns Internat'l Detective Agency,
Inc., dated December 22, 1952, in the Yale Law Library.
117. See Cracking Down; on Shoplifters, supra note 5, at 58.
118. See id. at 61; Women's Wear Daily, January 18, 1952, p. 47, col. 3; Supernarket
News, June 9, 1952, p. 8, col. 5; Supermarket News, July 28, 1952, p. 8, col. 1.
119. A statute allowing arbitrary arrest without warrant would be unconstitutional,
See, e.g., Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573 (1889). Whether a statutory extension of
arrest powers beyond the common-law rule is constitutional depends on its "reasonable-
ness." See, e.g., Snyder v. United States, 285 Fed. 1 (4th Cir. 1922) ; Tarantina v. Louis-
ville Ry. Co., 98 N.E. 999 (Ill. 1912). See also Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28
VA. L. REv. 315, 323 (1942).
120. See note 112 supra and accompanying text. See also N.H. Laws 1941, c. 163,
§2; R.I. Pub. Laws 1941, c. 982, §68, cl. 1.
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to arrest procedures. Such legislation would conform the law to e:dsting in-
stitutional practices, 21 allowing a merchant who did not witness the shopper's
conduct to undertake an investigation where he has reasonable ground to be-
lieve the person guilty of shoplifting. The merchant may apprehend the sus-
pect without loss of vital time in the search for a peace officer, or jeopardizing
customer goodwill by the presence of police in the store. If the detained sus-
pect demonstrates his innocence, he will have been spared the stigma of arrest.
However, if the suspect proves recalcitrant, the merchant can summon a peace
officer who did not view the offence; because of his position of authority, the
officer may have greater success in questioning the subject. So long as the
"reasonableness" requirements of the paragraph are met, neither the merchant
nor the peace officer will be liable in tort for false imprisonment or assault
and battery. The merchant's desire to maintain good public relations will
probably serve as a practical restraint upon arbitrary detention. 1 -2
The second paragraph of the proposed legislation, modeled in part on the
arrest statutes of Rhode Island and Wisconsin, aims a more permissive rule
of arrest specifically at the store thief.Y A merchant might reasonably deter-
mine, on the basis of his or an employee's observation, or upon observation
supplemented by questioning privileged under paragraph one, to instigate the
arrest of a shoplifting suspect who would otherwise escape unchallenged. The
merchant may then summon a peace officer who, under paragraph two of the
proposed statute, could make a lawful arrest without warrant on the basis of the
merchant's communication.- 4 The suggested legislation would remove the re-
strictive "at peril" aspects of such an arrest: even if the suspect eventually
proved guiltless, the peace officer would not be liable for false imprisonment,
nor would the merchant or an employee if he had reasonable ground for request-
ing the arrest. 12 Under this statute, merchants and law enforcement agencies
may co-operate in a sustained effort to combat shoplifting and related criminal
activity.
121. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
122. See text at notes 78 and S1 supra.
123. See RI. Pub. Laws 1941, c. 932, § 68, ci. 5; Wis. STAT. § 354.03 (1951). Metro-
politan police departments have advocated such legislation. See Comment, 39 C.,mr. L
REV. 96, 104 (1951); Communication to the YAL L' Jovaumi, from Harold Anderzon,
Chief of Detectives, Kansas City, Mo., Police Dep't, dated December 16, 1952, in the Yale
Law Library.
For a similar recommendations, consult Potts, The Law of Arrest, 1 Bmxo L R.
397, 409 (1949) ; Stone, Arrest Vithout Warrant by a Peace Officer in New Yorb, 21
N.Y.U.L.Q. R-v. 61, 87 (1946).
124. Cases have long held that the accusatory statements of a credible person provide
an arrester with "reasonable ground" to arrest. E.g., Smith v. Tate, 143 Tenn. 26, 227
SAV. 1026 (1920). See Perkins, The Lawe of Arrest, 25 IowA L REv. 201, 239 (1940).
See CA.L. PN.L Com § 8 36 (Deering, 1941), Dowdell v. Owl Drug Co., 121 Cal. App.
316, 8 P.2d 890 (1932). See also Haggard v. First Nat. Bank of Mandan, 72 N.D. 437,
8 NAV2d 5 (1943).
125. The cases are not in harmony as to whether the authority possessed by peace
officers in some situations to arrest without warrant on probable cause shields from lia-
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21. Fort Wayne, Ind.
22. Glendale, Calif.
23. Grand Forks, N.D.
24. Hartford, Conn.
25. Joplin, Mo.
26. Kansas City, Mo.
27. Lima, Ohio


























































bility for false imprisonment a private person whose oral charges alone provided the prob-
able cause. Many cases hold that the private person's liability is to be determined as
though he himself made the arrest. Compare Harris v. Terminal R. Ass'n, 203 Mo. App.
324, 218 S.W. 686 (1920) ; Grinnell v. Weston, 95 App. Div. 454, 88 N.Y.Supp. 781 (1st
Dep't 1904), with Van v. Pacific Coast Co., 120 Fed. 699 (C.C. Wash. 1903); Haggard
v. First Nat. Bank, 72 N.D. 434, 8 N.W.2d 5 (1943). The final sentence in 12 of the
proposed statute renders a merchant or his employee immune from liability where he had
reasonable ground to request an arrest.
tThese statistics were compiled from replies to a questionnaire distributed by the
YALE LAw JoURNAL to 125 cities of 25,000 population or over. Dismissals, probations,
references to juvenile guidance personnel, and other special dispositions are not listed.
Copies of the questionnaire and the 65 replies are on file in the Yale Law Library.
:t"Cleared by arrest" means police considered case solved and thus closed on arrest,








34. Morgantown, W. Va.
35. Muskegon, Mich-*
36. Newark, N.J.
37. New Haven, Conn.
38. New Orleans, La.
39. New York, N.Y.*










50. St. Paul, Minn.
51. Salina, Kans.
52. San Antonio, Te-xms (1952)
53. San Diego, Calif.
54. San Francisco, Calif.
55. Sheboygan, Wis.

















































































SHOPLIFTING AND THE LAW OF ARREST
$"Cleared by arrest" means police considered case solved and thus closed on arrest.
*Information unavailable. Dash (-) indicates information not included in reply to
questionnaire.
